

Paradoxes and the structure of reasoning

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(UConn logo, 1959)

Paradoxes

Introduction

Think about testing a hypothesis.

A simplified picture:

1. **Suppose** the hypothesis is **true**.
2. Figure out **what else** would **follow**.
3. **Check** whether those other things are really true.
4. **If not**, the hypothesis was wrong.

2. Figure out **what else** would **follow**.

Here, some basic assumptions are helpful, like:

- things either **are** a certain way or they're **not**,
- if things are one way, they're not also any **incompatible** way,
- for something to be **true** is for things to be as it says they are,
- we can think about **collections** of things that are a certain way,
and so on.

If those basic assumptions aren't **trustworthy**,
the whole project falls apart.

Paradoxes

Examples

Liar paradox

“This sentence is not true.”

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If it's **true**, then it's not true.

So if it's true, it's **both** true and not true.

But that's a contradiction!

So it's not true after all.

Liar paradox

“This sentence is not true.”

If it's **true**, then it's not true.

So if it's true, it's **both** true and not true.

But that's a contradiction!

So it's not true after all.

But that's what it says! So it **is** true.

It's both true and not true.

We have a contradiction.

Curry paradox

“If this sentence is true, then $2 + 2 = 5$.”

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If it's **true**, then if it's true, then $2 + 2 = 5$.

So if it's true, $2 + 2$ **does** = 5.

Curry paradox

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If it's **true**, then if it's true, then $2 + 2 = 5$.

So if it's true, $2 + 2$ **does** = 5.

But that's what it says! So it **is** true.

So $2 + 2 = 5$.

Russell paradox (1/2)

Some collections **don't** contain themselves.
Others **do**.

Think of the **collection of all limes**,
and the **collection of everything else**.

Russell paradox (2/2)

Now, think of the collection of all collections that don't contain themselves.

(It contains, among other things, the collection of all limes.)

But does it contain itself?

If it **does**, it **doesn't**.

If it **doesn't**, it **does**.

It's a lot like the liar sentence;
it leads to contradiction in the same way.

The **basic assumptions** we use to investigate **anything** seem to be broken.

If it follows from the mere existence of a Curry sentence that $2 + 2 = 5$,
what right do we have to say the Earth isn't flat?

We have a choice:

- Give up. Our reasoning really is broken.
Maybe we can find another way to learn.
Maybe not.

OR

- Push on. Find **some** trustworthy reasoning,
even if it's not what we're used to.

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Paradoxes

A bit of formalism

A stock of symbols:

- \neg Negation, not
- $\&$ Conjunction, and
- T True
- λ the liar sentence
- \vdash Entailment, follows from

The liar sentence λ is $\neg T\lambda$.

We can derive a contradiction from $T\lambda$:

$$\frac{T\lambda \quad \frac{\frac{T\lambda}{\lambda}}{\neg T\lambda}}{T\lambda \ \& \ \neg T\lambda}$$

So by **reductio**, we can conclude $\neg T\lambda$.

We can go on to derive a contradiction from $\neg T\lambda$
(which we have now proved!):

$$\frac{\frac{\neg T\lambda}{\lambda}}{\frac{T\lambda}{T\lambda \ \& \ \neg T\lambda}} \quad \neg T\lambda$$

So by **explosion**, everything follows.

Here are the steps we've used:

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{\neg T\lambda}{\lambda} \quad \frac{\lambda}{\neg T\lambda} \\
 \\
 \frac{A}{TA} \quad \frac{TA}{A} \\
 \\
 \frac{A \quad B}{A \& B}
 \end{array}
 \qquad
 \begin{array}{c}
 [A] \\
 \vdots \\
 \frac{B \& \neg B}{\neg A} \\
 \\
 \frac{A \& \neg A}{B}
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Vocabulary?

Negation?

One way to undermine this argument is to focus on **negation**.

Two main flavours:

- Maybe **reductio** is the problem?
- Maybe **explosion** is the problem?

That is, maybe it's wrong to think that something leading to a contradiction must be **false**.

Or maybe it's wrong to think that things can't be two **incompatible** ways.

Or maybe it's wrong to think that **not being** a certain way is incompatible with **being** that way.

Problem 1: What, then, makes negation **negation**?

Problem 2: Paradoxes that have nothing to do with negation.

Vocabulary?

Truth?

Another way to undermine the argument is to focus on **truth**.

Two main flavours:

- Maybe $T\lambda$ doesn't really entail λ ?
- Maybe λ doesn't really entail $T\lambda$?

That is, maybe being **true** is something different
from **telling it like it is**.

Problem 1: We can just rebuild the paradoxes with 'tells it like it is' instead of 'is true'.

The thought must be that 'telling it like it is' is **incoherent**.

But this **undermines inquiry** even more directly
than the paradoxes originally did!

Problem 2: Paradoxes that have nothing to do with truth.

Pseudo-Scotus:

God exists

Therefore, this argument is invalid.

Suppose God exists, and suppose the argument is valid.

Then the argument must be invalid.

So it is both valid and invalid; contradiction.

Thus, if God exists the argument must be invalid.

But this is to prove its conclusion from its premise,
so it really **is** valid!

Since the argument is valid, if God exists, then it is invalid.

But this would be a contradiction.

So God does not exist.

Vocabulary?

The problem

Solutions that focus on **particular vocabulary** are limited to paradoxes where that vocabulary plays some role.

As long as we consider only the **liar**,
solutions focusing on **negation** or **truth**
can seem plausible.

But the **Curry** and **Russell** paradoxes have **no** vocabulary in common at all!

Curry: 'If this sentence is true, then $2 + 2 = 5$ '.

Russell: The collection of all collections that do not contain themselves.

No approach that focuses on particular vocabulary can get at the general phenomenon.

Structure

Two options

If it's not particular vocabulary, then what is it?

There are two main families of response.

Both focus not on the **steps** in our proof,
but on its **structure**.

Structure

Noncontractive logics

Return to the derivation of a contradiction from $T\lambda$:

$$\frac{T\lambda \quad \frac{\frac{T\lambda}{\lambda}}{\neg T\lambda}}{T\lambda \ \& \ \neg T\lambda}$$

Note that this uses $T\lambda$ **twice**.

$T\lambda$ on its own does not lead to contradiction.

So our reductio should conclude
not $\neg T\lambda$ outright,

but just that if $T\lambda$ holds, then $\neg T\lambda$ holds.
(And we already knew this!)

Keeping track of **number** in this way
means rejecting **contraction**:

$$\frac{A, A \vdash C}{A \vdash C}$$

Two As might suffice for C where **one** does not.

Blocking **contraction** is enough
to prevent the paradoxes from causing trouble.

The liar and Russell no longer lead to contradiction,
Curry no longer leads to $2 + 2 = 5$,
and so on.

Valid reasoning now not only **uses** its premises,
but **uses them up**.

Structure

Nontransitive logics

A different approach focuses on the very last step.

At this step, we have proved $T\lambda \ \& \ \neg T\lambda$,
and then explosion gives us any B at all.

That is, we **chain together** our argument **to** $T\lambda \ \& \ \neg T\lambda$
with the argument **from** $T\lambda \ \& \ \neg T\lambda$ to B .

The move is a case of **transitivity**:

$$\frac{A \vdash B \quad B \vdash C}{A \vdash C}$$

It's surprising (and it takes a lot of work to show!) but transitivity is completely **dispensable** most of the time. It's a **shortcut** only; we can do the same things without it.

One instance where this is **not** the case, though, is exactly the crucial link in the paradoxical argument.

A valid argument from A to C **rules out** asserting A while denying C .

If we've ruled out asserting A while denying B ,	$A \vdash B$
and ruled out asserting B while denying C ,	$B \vdash C$
have we ruled out asserting A while denying C ?	$A \vdash^? C$

A valid argument from A to C **rules out** asserting A while denying C .

If we've ruled out asserting A while denying B ,	$A \vdash B$
and ruled out asserting B while denying C ,	$B \vdash C$
have we ruled out asserting A while denying C ?	$A \not\vdash C$

No!

Asserting A while denying C can still be fine,
so long as we **remain silent** about B .

Blocking **transitivity** is a different way
to prevent the paradoxes from causing trouble.

We still get a contradiction: $\vdash T\lambda \ \& \ \neg T\lambda$.

And we can have $A \ \& \ \neg A \vdash B$.

But without transitivity, this is ok!

Structure

Cumulative reasoning

Consider the following procedure
for reasoning from some stock of premises:

Cumulative reasoning:

1. Start from some stock of premises.
2. Draw conclusions that follow from your stock.
3. Add those conclusions to your original stock, resulting in an expanded stock.
4. Go back to step 2 and repeat.

$$\frac{X \vdash A \quad X, A \vdash C}{X \vdash C}$$

$$\frac{X \vdash A \quad X, A \vdash C}{X \vdash C}$$

Noncontractive and nontransitive approaches **agree** here:
this is not ok!

For the noncontractivist, this uses X twice to get to C ;
its conclusion needs to be $X, X \vdash C$.

For the nontransitivist, this chains things together on A ;
it cannot be repaired, but much of the time is dispensable.

- Paradoxes seem to show that something is **seriously wrong** in our usual practices of inquiry.
- Solutions that focus on **particular vocabulary** like negation or truth miss how widespread paradoxes are.
- Solutions that focus on the **structure** of reasoning do better.
- They have the upshot that **cumulative reasoning** is not always trustworthy.